Box Info

PlatformHackTheBox
DifficultyMedium
OSWindows
Key TechniquesPassword Spraying, Azure AD Connect Credential Extraction

Attack Path Summary

Enumerated domain users → password spraying found SABatchJobs account → used those creds to access SMB shares → found azure.xml containing mhope’s password → logged in as mhope via evil-winrm → mhope is member of Azure Admins group → extracted Azure AD Connect credentials → Domain Admin.


Enumeration

sudo nmap -p- -Pn -T4 $ip -oN nmap/tcp_scan
sudo nmap -sCV -p <PORTS> -Pn -T4 $ip

Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL


Foothold — Password Spraying

Found the SABatchJobs account through password spraying — the password was the same as the username.

First creds: SABatchJobs:SABatchJobs

SMB Enumeration with Creds

Used SABatchJobs to enumerate SMB shares. Found an azure.xml file containing Azure AD credentials:

<Objs Version="1.1.0.1" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/2004/04">
  <Obj RefId="0">
    <TN RefId="0">
      <T>Microsoft.Azure.Commands.ActiveDirectory.PSADPasswordCredential</T>
    </TN>
    <Props>
      <S N="Password">4n0therD4y@n0th3r$</S>
    </Props>
  </Obj>
</Objs>

Second creds: mhope:4n0therD4y@n0th3r$

evil-winrm -i $ip -u 'mhope' -p '4n0therD4y@n0th3r$'

Privilege Escalation — Azure AD Connect

mhope was a member of the Azure Admins group. Azure AD Connect stores credentials for syncing on-prem AD with Azure AD — and those credentials can be extracted.

The Azure AD Connect database contains the domain admin password used for synchronization. With the right access, you can decrypt it.

Domain Admin creds: administrator:d0m@in4dminyeah!


Credentials

UsernamePasswordSource
SABatchJobsSABatchJobsPassword spraying
mhope4n0therD4y@n0th3r$azure.xml in SMB share
administratord0m@in4dminyeah!Azure AD Connect extraction

What I Learned

Password spraying — always try username=password and common weak passwords against enumerated users. SABatchJobs:SABatchJobs is a classic service account mistake.

Azure AD Connect — when you see this installed on a box and you have access to the Azure Admins group, the sync credentials are extractable. Is a known attack path.

XML config files in SMB shares — always check every file. The azure.xml with cleartext credentials was the pivot point.

Pattern: “Azure AD Connect on a DC + Azure Admins group membership = extract the sync credentials for Domain Admin.”